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Abstract Musical works change. Bruckner revised his Eighth Symphony. Ella
Fitzgerald and many other artists have made it acceptable to sing the jazz standard
‘‘All the Things You Are’’ without its original verse. If we accept that musical
works genuinely change in these ways, a puzzle arises: why can’t I change
Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony? More generally, why are some individuals in a
privileged position when it comes to changing musical works and other artifacts,
such as novels, films, and games? I give a view of musical works that helps to
answer these questions. Musical works, on this view, are created abstract objects
with no parts. The paradigmatic changes that musical works undergo are socially
determined normative changes in how they should be performed. Due to contingent
social practices, Bruckner, but not I, can change how his symphony should be
performed. Were social practices radically different, I would be able to change his
symphony. This view extends to abstract artifacts beyond music, including novels,
films, words, games, and corporations.
Keywords Music  Abstract objects  Ontology of art  Change  Rohrbaugh 
Evnine
1 Introduction
Bruckner composed his Eighth Symphony in 1887 and revised it in 1890. He
changed, among other things, the tonality of the third movement. ‘‘All the Things
You Are,’’ a jazz standard composed in 1939 by Jerome Kern for the unsuccessful
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musical Very Warm for May, is typically performed without its original verse. Ella
Fitzgerald, Frank Sinatra, Jo Stafford, Sarah Vaughan, and many others sing only
what was originally its chorus. ‘‘Happy Birthday to You’’—perhaps the most
familiar song in the English language—often concludes with the words ‘‘and many
more,’’ but this was not originally the case. ‘‘L’chah Dodi,’’ a Jewish liturgical song,
acquired different melodies in Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities.
In these cases, people perform musical works differently over time.1 But that is
not all. What counts as a correct performance changes, too. When Bruckner revised
his symphony, he changed the correct way to perform it. The jazz community has
made it acceptable to sing ‘‘All the Things You Are’’ without its original verse.
There may be other correct ways to sing it, but this is now at least a correct way.
There are now different ways to correctly sing ‘‘Happy Birthday to You’’ and
‘‘L’chah Dodi.’’
Some theorists deny that musical works change in these ways. Musical Platonists,
for instance Dodd (2007) and Kivy (1987), think musical works are eternal,
immutable abstract objects. They are immutable in the sense that their intrinsic
properties do not change. A standard Platonist line is that each ostensible change
people make to a work—no matter how minor—involves a discovery of a different
(albeit related) work (Dodd 2007: 53–56). On this line, Bruckner did not change his
Eighth Symphony. Instead he composed a symphony in 1887 and then another very
similar one in 1890. Similarly, Platonists may deny that there is a unique song—
‘‘L’chah Dodi’’—that Ashkenazi and Sephardic communities sing differently. There
are instead two (related) songs that go by the name ‘‘L’chah Dodi.’’
Conversely, Rohrbaugh (2003) and Evnine (2009, 2016: 137–138) think the
intrinsic properties of musical works change. They think Bruckner changed his
symphony in 1890 instead of composing another one. But there is a puzzle. Imagine
I propose a new melody for the ending of the last movement of Bruckner’s Eighth
Symphony. No matter how hard I try, I will fail. I may perform the symphony
differently (with the help of an orchestra), but I cannot change it. Bruckner has the
power to change the symphony, but I do not. Why not?
One might insist that Bruckner is the only one who can change his symphony,
simply because it is his symphony. He created it and thus has total creative control.
At best, this explanation is incomplete. Jazz standards and folk songs often change
without their creators’ input. Moreover, we may change many things we have not
created. I can refinish my kitchen table, even though I am not its creator. So, it will
not suffice to point out merely that Bruckner, but not I, created his symphony.
A view of musical works, then, should explain not only Bruckner’s transforma-
tive power but also my inefficacy. We may phrase the underlying puzzle more
generally: why are some individuals in a privileged position when it comes to
1 When I speak of musical works in this paper I confine myself to works that are intended to be
performed—i.e. works for performance. I will not discuss works for playback. This second category
plausibly includes works in electronica, rock, R?B, and hip-hop that, instead of being designed for
performance, are intended to be recorded and later played back. See, for instance, Gracyk (1996), Davies
(2001), and Kania (2006) for discussion of works for playback. Ferguson (1983) denies there are such
works.
D. Friedell
123
changing or revising musical works and other artifacts, such as novels, films, and
games? I call this the revision puzzle. I will give a view of musical works that helps
to solve the revision puzzle. On this view, musical works are created abstract objects
with no parts.2 Rules, granted normative significance by social practices, govern
how musical works should be performed. Different rules may apply to a work at
different times. These normative changes explain how works change. When works
do not change, such as when I fail to revise Bruckner’s symphony, it is because
social practices do not allow change to happen.
Consequently, my view occupies a middle ground. Like Rohrbaugh and Evnine, I
preserve the intuitive ways in which musical works change. There is only one
Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony. Bruckner changed it. He didn’t compose a new work
in 1890. In a move that is friendly to Platonists, however, I deny that such changes
alter intrinsic properties of musical works. Changes to how works should be
performed alter only their extrinsic properties. This idea promises a unified solution
to the revision puzzle for artifacts beyond music. Changes to a symphony’s notes, a
game’s rules, a novel’s words, and a word’s spelling are all, on my view, socially
determined normative changes to the extrinsic properties of these artifacts.
One need not accept my specific view of musical works in order to adopt my
general solution to the revision puzzle. For instance, Caplan and Matheson’s (2006)
version of musical perdurantism and Moruzzi’s (2018) musical stage theory both
take musical works to be concrete objects. Both views allow for the paradigmatic
changes that musical works undergo to be socially determined changes to the works’
extrinsic properties. Accordingly, these views are consistent with my general
solution to the revision puzzle. I will give a reason to prefer my specific view that
musical works are created partless abstracta, but I will not conclusively argue for
this view. Ultimately, the view should be of special interest to those who think both
that musical works are abstract and that the revision puzzle is a genuine puzzle.
The paper will proceed as follows. In Sect. 2, I will introduce my view of musical
works. In Sect. 3, I will show how the view helps to solve the revision puzzle with
respect to musical works. I will explain why my view is in a better position to solve
the revision puzzle than Rohrbaugh’s and Evnine’s views. I will also discuss why
musical perdurantists and musical stage theorists may adopt my more general
solution to the revision puzzle. Last, in Sect. 4, I will show how my view applies to
abstract artifacts beyond music, including fictional characters, novels, films, games,
and words. Although I will not conclusively argue for my view, I will show that it
has advantages.
2 The view
I start with three claims about musical works. First, people create musical works.
They bring them into existence. This is a deeply intuitive feature of musical works
(Levinson 1980: 8). Second, works are abstract objects. They are not located in
2 More precisely, they have no proper parts. When I talk about parts I confine myself to only proper parts.
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space. Consider Seeger’s String Quartet. Its performances and copies of its score are
spatially located, but the quartet itself is nowhere.3 Third, musical works are objects
that have no parts. In other words, they are what metaphysicians call simples. Often
when theorists, such as Ned Markosian (1998), talk about simples they have in mind
concrete simples. But there is precedent for believing in abstract simples. McDaniel
(2003: 266), for instance, suggests that numbers are abstract simples.
On my view, then, musical works are created abstract partless objects. The most
surprising aspect of this is perhaps the claim that works are partless. We talk as if
musical works have parts. We say movements are parts of symphonies and that
lyrics and verses are parts of songs. Moreover, it is natural to think a musical work is
a sequence of sounds—more precisely, a type of sound sequence that can be
instantiated when the work is performed. Types of sound sequences are commonly
called sound structures.4 Plausibly, if works are sound structures, then types of
sounds are parts of works. There are many reasons, then, why one might doubt my
claim that musical works are partless.5
Before explaining how I think musical works are related to sound structures,
movements, lyrics, and verses, I must discuss a central concept: performance rules.
Performance rules prescribe a way to perform a particular musical work. They
specify a variety of features. Sometimes they dictate which instruments should be
used and which notes should be played. Sometimes they dictate that musicians
should improvise in a particular key. Performances of works do not always perfectly
follow the rules. People make mistakes. Performance rules settle how works should
be performed, not how they are performed.6
Anyone can try to prescribe a way to perform a musical work. Social practices,
however, affect which rules become the work’s performance rules—which rules
determine a correct way to perform the work. For instance, social practices
pertaining to Western classical music typically privilege the original composer’s
intentions. This helps to explain why I cannot change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony.
If I propose new performance rules for the symphony, they do not become its rules.
They have no effect on what is a correct way to perform it. But social practices do
3 Many theorists agree that musical works are abstract—for instance, Dodd (2007), Evnine (2009: 209,
2016: 137–138), Kivy (1987), and Levinson (1980, 2011). But this is controversial. Caplan and Matheson
(2006), Tillman and Spencer (2012), and Morruzi (2018) offer materialist views of music. Cox (1986), as
well as Cray and Matheson (2017), propose that musical works are ideas. Davies (2003) claims that
musical works are actions. See Goehr (1992) and Kania (2013), for instance, for discussion of anti-realist
alternatives.
4 See Levinson (1980) for critical discussion of the view that musical works are sound structures.
5 Dodd (2007: 48–53) relatedly claims that works are ‘‘unstructured.’’
6 It is hard to say exactly what makes a performance be of a particular work. Following Davies (2001:
166–175), I think a necessary condition for a performance to be of a particular work is that the
performance be causally connected in the appropriate way to the creation of the work. On this line, a
performance in a distant galaxy may coincidentally sound exactly like Seeger’s String Quartet but fail to
be a performance of that quartet. The performance is not causally connected in the appropriate way to
Seeger’s creation of her quartet.
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not always privilege the original composer. I will further discuss how musical works
change in Sect. 3.7
A work’s performance rules determine which sound structures it has. Consider
Seeger’s String Quartet. Seeger proposed performance rules for this quartet.8
Thanks to certain social practices, her rules became the work’s rules. Any
performance that follows these rules produces an instance of a particular sound
structure. This sound structure is String Quartet’s sound structure. The quartet has
this sound structure. All of this is consistent with correct performances of the quartet
(i.e. those that follow its performance rules) instantiating the same sound structure
but sounding different from each other. Such performances may differ in timbre,
dynamics, phrasing, tempo, and other qualities. Performance rules often leave such
things open to interpretation (Davies 2001: 20; Godlovitch 1998: 86).
Some works have distinct sets of performance rules. ‘‘L’chah Dodi’’ has
Sephardic rules and Ashekanzi rules. Singing the song by following its Sephardic
rules instantiates a sound structure. Singing the song by following its Ashkenazi
rules instantiates another sound structure. ‘‘L’chah Dodi’’ accordingly has a
Sephardic sound structure and an Ashkenazi one. It has (at least) two melodies.
These considerations motivate the following proposal.
Sound Structure: a musical work w has a sound structure s if w has a set of
performance rules r, such that there cannot be a performance of w that both
follows r and does not produce an instance of s.
The basic idea is that, if all performances of a work that follow the same
performance rules instantiate a particular sound structure, then the work has that
sound structure. This proposal is consistent with works, such as ‘‘L’chah Dodi,’’
having distinct sound structures that correspond to distinct sets of performance
rules.
This proposal accounts also for many improvisational works. Consider Elling-
ton’s jazz standard ‘‘C Jam Blues.’’ Performances of ‘‘C Jam Blues’’ sound vastly
different from each other, given that its performance rules call for ample
improvisation. Although its rules are more flexible than those of Western classical
music (setting aside concertos with improvised cadenzas), ‘‘C Jam Blues’’ has a
sound structure: a sparse melody involving C and G notes. Musicians correctly
performing ‘‘C Jam Blues’’ produce instances of its sound structure and improvise
their own melodies.9
7 Some theorists, such as Abell (2012), Danto (1981), and Dickie (1974), claim that social practices
affect whether something is an artwork. Goehr (1992) argues that what counts as a musical work is
socially constructed. I take no stand on what makes some musical works be artworks. (Note that some of
my examples—namely, ‘‘Happy Birthday to You’’ and ‘‘L’chah Dodi’’—are arguably not artworks.) Nor
will I discuss whether being a musical work is socially constructed. Rather, I appeal to social practices in
order to explain what makes musical works have the performance rules they have.
8 Seeger specified these rules by producing a score. Scores, although common, are merely one way of
specifying performance rules.
9 I am omitting some controversies surrounding jazz. For instance, Kania (2011) denies there are jazz
works, whereas Davies (2001: 16–19) claims that jazz-standard performances are themselves works rather
than performances of works.
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Some musical works have no sound structure. Consider Cage’s ‘‘Child of Tree.’’
One performs this piece by using ten preselected ‘‘instruments’’ that are either plants
or made from plant materials. Common choices include branches, leaves, and
amplified cacti. The performer has complete freedom to perform their own melodies
and percussive sounds. Hence, although performances of the work produce
instances of sound structures, the work itself has no associated sound structure. This
is no problem for my view. Not all musical works have sound structures. Works
may have performance rules without having sound structures.10
There is a caveat. I have given a sufficient but not necessary condition for a
musical work to have a sound structure. Here is why the condition is not necessary.
Imagine a song, ‘‘Coin Flip.’’ ‘‘Coin Flip’’ has only one set of performance rules. Its
rules require a guitarist to flip a coin in the middle of performing. If the coin lands
on heads the guitarist plays a certain melody. If the coin lands on tails the guitarist
plays a different melody. We may imagine that part of the fun for the audience is
seeing which melody will be performed, the ‘‘heads melody’’ or the ‘‘tails melody.’’
Intuitively, ‘‘Coin Flip’’ has a sound structure that correct performances instantiate
when the coin lands on heads but not when the coin lands on tails—even though all
of its correct performances follow the same set of performance rules. This case
thereby shows that the above condition is not necessary for a musical work to have a
sound structure. Note that ‘‘Coin Flip’’ is different from songs, such as ‘‘L’chah
Dodi’’, that may be performed differently due to having different sets of
performance rules. People who sing ‘‘L’chah Dodi’’ with a Sephardic melody
follow a different set of performance rules from those who use an Ashkenazi
melody. ‘‘Coin Flip’’, by stipulation, has only one set of performance rules.
I propose similar sufficient conditions for a work to have lyrics, movements, and
verses:
Lyrics: A musical work w has lyrics l if w has a set of performance rules r,
such that there cannot be a performance of w that both follows r and does not
involve a performance of l.
Movement: A musical work w has a movement m if w has a set of
performance rules r, such that there cannot be a performance of w that both
follows r and does not involve a performance of m.
Verses: A musical work w has a verse v, if w has a set of performance rules r,
such that there cannot be a performance of w that both follows r and does not
involve a performance of v.
These proposals give sufficient but not necessary conditions. Still, these proposals
and the one above about sound structures roughly characterize how musical works
are related to sound structures, lyrics, movements, and verses. Often (though not
always), each set of a work’s performance rules dictates that performers should
10 Wolterstorff (1975: 135–136) makes a similar point about Cage’s 4’33. However, that work arguably
has a sound structure: a single, sustained rest.
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instantiate a particular sound structure. Something similar is true of lyrics,
movements, and verses.
Here is an analogy to further clarify. Consider a law that dictates that a road has a
speed limit of fifty kilometers per hour. The law governs how people should drive
on the road. It pertains to the road but is neither identical to nor part of the road.
Moreover, the rate of fifty kilometers per hour is neither identical to nor part of the
road. Rather, this rate is closely associated with the road, due to the law in question.
I propose something analogous about musical works. A work’s performance rules
govern how people should perform the work. The rules pertain to the work but are
neither identical to nor part of the work. Moreover, sound structures—as well as
lyrics, movements, and verses—are neither identical to nor part of musical works.
Such things are closely associated with works, due to performance rules.
One might insist that movements are parts of symphonies and that verses are
parts of songs. I deny this. I grant that performances of movements and verses might
be parts of performances of musical works. But performances are events. This does
not mean that movements and verses themselves are parts of musical works.
Granted, we often talk as if works have parts. Such talk conveys something true but
is, strictly speaking, incorrect. At least, if there is a sense in which sound structures,
lyrics, movements, and verses are parts of works, it is different from the normal
sense of ‘‘part.’’
Thus far, I have presented (but not defended) a view on which musical works are
created abstract partless objects. In Sect. 2.1, I will further clarify the view and
respond to an objection. In Sects. 3 and 4, I will discuss some advantages of the
view.
2.1 What are musical works like?
If we accept that musical works are created abstract partless objects that sound
structures are neither part of nor identical to, it is natural to ask: what are the works
themselves like? There are two things one might want to know when asking this
question. First, one might want to know what ontological category musical works
belong to. What sort of thing are they? Musical works, on my view, belong to a sui
generis category of created abstract partless objects. They do not belong to a more
familiar ontological category. They are not types. They are not sets. They are not
properties.11 As I will discuss in Sect. 4, the category of created abstract partless
objects includes many other kinds of objects beyond music.
Second, when asking ‘‘What are musical works like?’’ one might want to know
what their intrinsic properties are.12 I borrow a characterization of the intrinsic/
extrinsic distinction from David Lewis. He writes, ‘‘A thing has its intrinsic
properties in virtue of the way that thing itself, and nothing else, is.’’ (Lewis 1983:
11 Currie (1989), Dodd (2007), Levinson (1980), and Wolterstorff (1975), for instance, claim that
musical works are types. Caplan and Matheson (2004: 129) consider a view on which musical works are
sets. Letts (2018) claims that works are properties.
12 Note that this is different from asking what are the essential properties of musical works. I briefly
discuss essential properties in Sect. 3.
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197). Properties that are not intrinsic are extrinsic. Has-a-screen and has-mass are
intrinsic properties of my laptop computer. In-a-cafe´ and belongs-to-me are some of
its extrinsic properties. On my view, has-a-sound-structure, has-lyrics, has-a-
movement, and has-a-verse are extrinsic properties of musical works. These are
properties works have not just in virtue of the way they are. Works have these
properties in virtue of the way their performance rules are. So, one might ask, what
intrinsic properties do musical works have?
Setting aside the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction momentarily, here are some
important properties of musical works: is-created, is-abstract, is-partless, and is-an-
object. It follows trivially that works have many other properties. They have
properties that, necessarily, all objects have. Such properties include is-self-
identical, is-colored-if-red, and is-a-walrus-or-not-a-walrus. They have negative
properties that, necessarily, all abstracta have, such as is-not-a-walrus and is-not-
red. Given that they are created, they also have temporal properties. For instance,
Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony has the property is-older-than-two-hundred-years. It is
controversial which of the properties just mentioned are intrinsic. It is controversial,
for instance, whether is-abstract and is-older-than-two-hundred-years are intrin-
sic.13 I take no stand here. Consequently, it is hard for me to say precisely what are
the intrinsic properties of musical works. I instead propose the following: musical
works have no (or hardly any) important intrinsic properties, other than those that
follow from their being created abstract partless objects. To put the point loosely:
there is not much more to say about what musical works are like other than that they
are created abstract partless objects.
It will help to compare musical works to spacetime points. Spacetime points,
supposing there are such things, are located in space but not extended in space. They
are simples. They are too small to have parts (Markosian 1998: 216). Plausibly, they
have all the same intrinsic properties as each other. They differ primarily in where
they are located. I construe musical works similarly. They, too, are partless objects
that are not extended in space. The main difference between musical works and
spacetime points is that works, since they are abstract, are not even located in space.
Another difference is that people create musical works. For this reason, works have
different temporal properties. Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony is older than Ellington’s
‘‘C Jam Blues.’’ Still, musical works have for the most part all of the same intrinsic
properties. They have different extrinsic properties. They have different perfor-
mance rules, sound structures, lyrics, verses, and movements.
It will help to consider also Amie Thomasson’s (1999) view of fictional
characters. Thomasson thinks Emma Woodhouse is an abstract object created by
Jane Austen. According to the first line of the novel Emma, Emma is handsome,
clever, and rich, but she—the character—is none of those things. She is merely
handsome, clever, and rich according to the story, and this amounts to a relation that
13 See, for instance, Denby (2014: 95) for discussion of whether is-abstract is intrinsic. See, for instance,
Sider (2000: 85) for discussion of whether temporal properties are intrinsic. It is controversial whether
some of the properties I have mentioned are even genuine properties. For instance, Armstrong (1978)
denies that there are negative properties. Zangwill (2011) argues that negative properties are less real than
positive ones.
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obtains between her and the story (and perhaps Austen as well). Thomasson does
not tell us much about what fictional characters themselves are like. I do not say
much about what musical works themselves are like. I do not think there is much to
say, other than that they are created abstract partless objects. Musical works, like
fictional characters on Thomasson’s view, are intrinsically boring. Most of their
interesting properties are extrinsic.
One might object that my view ignores many intrinsic properties of works.
Consider the following sentences:
(1) Mahler’s Third Symphony is long.
(2) Farrenc’s Third Symphony is in G-minor.
(3) Joplin’s ‘‘The Entertainer’’ is vibrant.
(4) Beach’s Gaelic Symphony is beautiful.
(1) and (2) ostensibly attribute non-aesthetic properties: is-long and is-in-G-minor.
(3) and (4) ostensibly attribute aesthetic ones: is-vibrant and is-beautiful. One might
claim that all of these sentences accurately attribute intrinsic properties to musical
works. If this is right, then works have many more intrinsic properties than I have
claimed.
I will mention two ways I can respond to this objection. The first option, inspired
by Wolterstorff (1975) and Dodd (2007: 46–47), is to claim that sentences (1)–(4)
are true but that their predicates are polysemous. On this line, Mahler’s Third
Symphony is long but in a special sense of ‘‘long.’’ ‘‘Is long’’ picks out the property
is-such-that-there-there-cannot-be-correct-performances-of-it-that-are-not-long.
This is a property the work has not just in virtue of the way it is. It has this property
in virtue of what its performance rules are like. On this line, then, (1) attributes an
extrinsic property to Mahler’s Third Symphony. Similar things may be said about
sentences (2)–(4).
A common objection to this kind of polysemy-strategy draws on linguistic data.
Consider two sentences from Letts (2018: 66).14
(5) The Festive Overture is loud, and so is your shirt.
(6) The Festive Overture is loud, and so was the performance I heard last
night.
(5) is infelicitous and jarring. This is consistent with The Festive Overture being
loud in a different sense than shirts are loud. (6), conversely, is felicitous. One might
think this shows that The Festive Overture is loud in the same sense that
performances are loud. One might conclude that ‘‘is loud’’ is not used polysemously
in (6)—and similarly object that the predicates in (1)–(4) are not used
polysemously.
I am unsure whether this objection works. Consider:
(7) He is healthy, and so is the food he prepares for his family. (Hawthorne
and Lepore 2011: 471.)
14 (Ostertag (2012: 366–367), Predelli (2011), and Kleinschmidt and Ross (2012, 135–137) also discuss
this objection.
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(7) is felicitous. It seems wrong to conclude that (7) says a person is healthy in the
same sense that food is healthy. Plausibly, (7) says the person and the food he
prepares are healthy in two different but related senses of ‘‘healthy.’’ The person is
in good health; the food is conducive to good health. If this is right, then perhaps
musical works are loud, long, vibrant, and beautiful in senses of these terms that are
different but related to senses in which performances are loud, long, vibrant, and
beautiful. Maybe the polysemy-strategy is right after all.
Even if the polysemy-strategy fails, there is a second option. I may give an error
theory. On this line, sentences (1)–(4) are false but convey something true about
musical works and their performance rules. I take no stand on whether the error
theory is better than the polysemy-strategy. Both approaches are reasonable. Either
way, sentences (1)–(4) on my view do not accurately attribute intrinsic properties to
musical works.
3 Change
My view accounts for how musical works change. Bruckner revised his Eighth
Symphony. ‘‘All the Things You Are’’ may now be correctly performed without its
original verse. ‘‘Happy Birthday to You’’ now often concludes with the words ‘‘and
many more.’’ ‘‘L’chah Dodi’’ now has Sephardic and Ashkenazi melodies. On my
view, these works get new performance rules and thereby new sound structures and
lyrics. For instance, Bruckner gave his Eight Symphony new performance rules. In
doing so he changed how people should perform the work, including what notes
they should play toward the end of the third movement. As a result, the sound
structure that correct performances of this work instantiate is different from the
sound structure that correct performances previously instantiated. This is how the
work acquired a new sound structure.15
As described above, Platonists typically deny that musical works change in these
ways. Conversely, Rohrbaugh’s continuant-view (2003) and Evnine’s hylomorphist
proposal (2009: 209, 2016: 137–138) allow for works to change. Rohrbaugh thinks
musical works are ‘‘continuants’’: non-physical individuals that depend for their
existence on physical things, such as scores and performances. Rohrbaugh claims
works are ‘‘temporally flexible,’’ by which he means that their intrinsic properties
may change. He thinks this happens paradigmatically with folk songs that are sung
differently over time (Rohrbaugh 2003: 188).
15 The extent to which musical works may change is open to debate. Some readers might find it intuitive,
for instance, that Seeger’s String Quartet couldn’t have gone from having its initial sound structure to
moments later having the structure associated with Beyonce´’s album Lemonade. I think that, perhaps,
even this change is possible. I find it intuitive that at least some radical changes are possible. Mahler
could have revised his Third Symphony so that it became only three minutes long. Folk songs acquire
completely different melodies and lyrics. I find it intuitive that musical works may even cease to be
musical works! Someone may create a song and then turn it into a poem, by discarding the melody and
keeping only the lyrics. Eventually they may turn the poem into a speech by making the words less poetic
and more literal. The song, the poem, and the speech—it seems to me—are all the same object. I will not
defend such speculations here.
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Evnine, inspired by Levinson (1980), thinks composers create musical works by
indicating pre-existent sound structures.16 Evnine thinks a musical work is
constituted by, but distinct from, its sound structure. In other words, he thinks a
musical work is made of a sound structure. Similarly, he thinks clay statues are
constituted by clay.17 He thinks musical works change by being constituted by
different sound structures at different times. Likewise, he thinks a car may be
constituted by different mechanical parts at different times. In this way Evnine
agrees with Rohrbaugh that works are temporally flexible. A disadvantage of
Evnine’s view is that, since he takes works to be constituted by sound structures, he
cannot account for works, such as Cage’s Child of Tree, that have no associated
sound structure. As mentioned above, such works are no problem for my view.
There are reasons to think my view is better than both Rohrbaugh’s and Evnine’s
views at explaining how works change. Rohrbaugh and Evnine agree that Bruckner
revises his Eighth Symphony by changing its intrinsic properties. On Evnine’s view,
the work is literally made of a sound structure in 1887 and then a different one in
1890. On my view, Bruckner changes the work’s performance rules and thereby
changes its sound structure. But he does not change what the work is made of or
what its parts are. It has no parts! Bruckner changes only the work’s extrinsic
properties.
Even Platonists allow for changes to abstract objects’ extrinsic properties. For
instance, mathematical Platonists accept that p hasn’t always had the property
being-thought-about-by-Leibniz. It acquired this property sometime after Leibniz’s
birth. Platonists deny merely that we change the intrinsic properties of abstracta.
Some non-Platonists deny this, too. For instance, Thomasson (1999: 43–55), despite
thinking that authors create abstract fictional characters, accepts that we cannot
causally interact with characters after they are created. Those who agree with
Platonists and Thomasson that abstracta are in a deep sense immutable should prefer
my account of how musical works change to Evnine’s and Rohrbaugh’s accounts;
on my view, only extrinsic properties of musical works change.
Moreover, a view of music should explain more than the fact that works
sometimes change. It should explain also cases in which works do not change. That
is, a view of music should address the revision puzzle: why are some individuals in
a privileged position when it comes to changing musical works and other artifacts?
My view explains, for instance, why I cannot change the sound structure of
Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony, even if I sincerely propose new performance rules for
it. Social practices pertaining to Western classical music determine that I cannot
change how this symphony should be performed. My proposed performance rules,
unlike Bruckner’s, do not become the work’s rules. My proposed rules have no
normative force. Nobody respects them. People care about Bruckner’s intentions,
not mine. My proposal does not change how the work should be performed and thus
16 Levinson uses ‘indication’ as a technical term. Levinson (2013: 53–55) claims that indicating a sound
structure involves (a) selecting notes, (b) taking an attitude of approval toward those notes,
(c) appropriating those notes, and (d) establishing a rule about how those notes should be performed.
17 Many theorists have proposed that clay statues are constituted by but distinct from clay. See, for
instance, Baker (2007), Koslicki (2004), and Thomson (1998).
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fails to change its sound structure. Analogously, if I declare a new speed limit for a
road, I do not thereby change its speed limit. Social practices determine that only
government officials may make this change.18
Rohrbaugh and Evnine, however, are left with a mystery. They think Bruckner
may change the intrinsic properties of his symphony. Nobody else has this power.
Contrast this case with Jackson Pollock’s Convergence. Imagine I splash red paint
on it. Perhaps, social practices determine that I vandalize the painting and that a
similar act by Pollock would be a mere alteration. Nonetheless, social practices do
not prevent me from changing the painting’s intrinsic properties. It is hard to see
how they could. Regardless of what society thinks or does, anyone can change a
painting’s intrinsic properties. The same is true of other kinds of artworks, such as
sculptures, and even all concrete artifacts. I can refinish my kitchen table, even
though I am not its creator. I can change the bricks of buildings that were built
centuries ago. It is a mystery, then, on Rohrbaugh’s and Evnine’s accounts, why
Bruckner and only Bruckner can change his symphony’s intrinsic properties.
Perhaps, if pressed on the issue, Rohrbaugh and Evnine would agree with me
about the importance of social practices. That is, they might claim that social
practices explain why only Bruckner can change his symphony’s intrinsic
properties. I do not claim that it is impossible to give such an explanation. But it
is hard to see how such an explanation would work. In so many other cases—
paintings, sculptures, tables, buildings, and so on—social practices do not, and
ostensibly cannot, prevent individuals from changing an object’s intrinsic proper-
ties. Social practices, however, commonly prevent individuals from changing
normative and extrinsic properties of objects. Any vandal with a jackhammer can
change a road’s surface. Given our social practices, only a select few can change a
road’s speed limit. I can bend my fork but cannot change the socially determined
fact that it is proper to put it to the left of my plate.
My view, then, has two main advantages over Rohrbaugh’s and Evnine’s
accounts: (a) my view allows for a work’s sound structure to change, while still
being consistent with the view that abstracta are in some sense immutable, and
(b) my view more easily appeals to social practices in order to solve the revision
puzzle.
Social practices, of course, are contingent. An upshot of my solution to the
revision puzzle is that, were social practices radically different, I would be able to
change the sound structure of Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony. This is a feature—not a
bug! Imagine all composers, performers, and fans of Western classical music task an
international organization with determining how symphonies should be performed.
Imagine this organization grants me supreme power to make musical decisions. I am
thereby able to change the performance rules and the sound structure of the
symphony. Of course, even if I were to make such changes, people would still be
able to perform the symphony as Bruckner intended in 1890 for it to be performed. I
cannot change that.
18 See Irvin (2005) for related discussion. Irvin claims that artists often determine certain features of their
artworks by enacting a ‘‘sanction’’ that is related to their intentions and artistic conventions.
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To appreciate the contingency of social practices we need not consider such
science-fiction. We may reflect on the diversity of social practices in the real world.
Practices do not always privilege the intentions of composers. Many musical
traditions privilege the intentions of performers. This is what enables jazz standards,
folk songs, and ‘‘Happy Birthday’’ to change.
Even in Western classical music composers do not always get the last word.
Bruckner died before he could complete his Ninth Symphony. Bach died before he
could complete The Art of Fugue. Artists have proposed completions of these
works. Letocart and Schaller, for instance, have proposed influential completions of
Bruckner’s Ninth Symphony. Platonists may insist that Letocart’s completion and
Schaller’s completion are two works that are distinct from Bruckner’s incomplete
symphony. I think instead that Letocart and Schaller have proposed ways of
performing Bruckner’s Ninth Symphony. Similar things happen in literature when
writers die. Fitzgerald’s friend, Edmund Wilson, finished The Last Tycoon after
Fitzgerald died. Wilson’s version is the canonical version. Robinson’s Memoirs
were finished by her daughter. Wallace’s The Pale King was posthumously finished
by his editor. Sometimes things get complicated. Sometimes it is hard to know
which ways of performing a musical work are correct—and which versions of
literary works are canonical—but this is to be expected. Socially determined
normative facts are often complicated. That is why, for instance, we have lawyers
and judges to help us settle complicated legal disputes.
I should highlight a worry one might have with my account of how musical
works change. Sometimes, changes to a work’s performance rules do not seem to
change the work itself. For instance, it is now acceptable to use a guitar to perform
Bach’s works that were once deemed only for lute. Intuitively, these works haven’t
changed. Only what counts as an acceptable way to perform them has changed.
Contrast this case with the German national anthem, Das Lied der Deutschen. After
World War II, Germany removed the first stanza due to its problematic political
connotations. Intuitively, the anthem genuinely changed. My view, however, treats
both cases as involving, fundamentally, the same kind of change. Both cases involve
changes to a work’s performance rules. It is now acceptable to perform Bach’s lute
compositions with a guitar. It is no longer acceptable to sing Germany’s national
anthem with the first stanza. Some theorists might worry that my view thereby
conflates two different kinds of changes.
There is room on my account to explain why we think of Germany’s national
anthem, but not Bach’s instrumental works, as changing. Performative changes that
involve elements we closely associate with a work—for instance, a work’s lyrics or
sound structure—are colloquially described as changes to the work itself. Changes
to a work’s peripheral elements, such as its instrumentation, are less often described
as changes to the work itself. Still, on my view, this is a difference without a deep
metaphysical difference. All of these changes are changes to how a work should be
performed and affect only a work’s extrinsic properties.19
19 An underlying issue is the accuracy and authenticity of performances of musical works. See, for
instance, Bicknell (2018), Davies (2001), Dodd (2015), Goehr (1992), and Kivy (1995) for discussion of
authenticity of performances.
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I have claimed a musical work’s sound structure can change over time. This issue
is distinct from the question of whether a work, when it first existed, could have had
a different sound structure from the one it actually had. Now is a good time for me
to say something about the latter. I agree with Rohrbaugh (2003) that works may
have been created with different sound structures. Emahoy Tsegue´-Maryam
Gue`brou’s piano solo Homesickness is largely in D major with a section in G
major. She could have created it with a sound structure that was entirely in D major.
One might wonder if I think any properties of works are essential. I think some
are. Works are essentially created abstract partless objects. Moreover, as Levinson
(1980), Rohrbaugh (2005), and Evnine (2009) claim, works are essentially created
by their actual composers. For instance, The Creation is essentially created by
Haydn. It could not have existed without Haydn creating it. Someone else could
have created a work that sounded exactly the same, but it would not have been The
Creation.20
3.1 Stage theory and perdurantism
I have argued that my view of music more easily solves the revision puzzle than
Rohrbaugh’s and Evnine’s views. One may accept my claim that musical works are
created partless abstracta, however, without thinking that social practices are
involved at all in a work’s changes. More importantly, one need not accept my
specific view of musical works in order to accept my general solution to the revision
puzzle. I will explain in this section how musical perdurantists and musical stage
theorists may adopt my general solution.
Moruzzi (2018) defends musical stage theory. On her view, a musical work is an
individual performance. Caplan and Matheson (2006) defend a related view:
musical perdurantism. On their version of musical perdurantism, a musical work is a
fusion of all of its performances. Both views take musical works to be concrete
rather than abstract.
One might worry that Moruzzi’s stage theory faces an immediate problem.
Consider the sentence, ‘‘Seeger’s String Quartet has been performed for many
years.’’ Intuitively, it is true. How can it be true if a musical work is an individual
performance? Moruzzi addresses this issue. She claims that, although works are
individual performances, there is a privileged relation that connects performances
with other performances.21 When we say ‘‘Seeger’s String Quartet has been
performed for many years’’ we are not talking about an individual work per se but
instead a fusion of works/performances that share this privileged relation. This
fusion is precisely the fusion that Caplan and Matheson would identify with the
20 The connection between essence and modality is more complicated than my comments might suggest.
I think all essential properties are necessary properties. Following Fine (1994), however, I think not all
necessary properties are essential. See, for instance, Brogaard and Salerno (2007) for an account of
essence that is consistent with this observation.
21 See Moruzzi (2018: 345) for details on this privileged relation. The relation has a causal component, a
component that takes into account the intentions of performers, and a component that includes sonic
similarity.
D. Friedell
123
work itself. Moruzzi calls such fusions works-as-constructs. She calls individual
performances works-as-performances. She thinks that, strictly speaking, only
works-as-performances are musical works.
We can now see how Moruzzi, Caplan, and Matheson may adopt my general
solution to the revision puzzle. Caplan and Matheson may claim that Bruckner’s
Eighth Symphony is the fusion of all of its performances, including those that
happened before and after Bruckner revised it in 1890. Sound structures, since they
are abstract, are not part of the concrete fusion. Caplan and Matheson may agree
with me, then, that changing a work’s sound structure does not involve changing
any of its intrinsic properties. They may claim that Bruckner changed merely what
counts as a correct performance of the work and in doing so changed which sound
structure performances should instantiate. Moreover, they may agree with me that
social practices enabled Bruckner to make this sort of change and prevent me from
doing so.22
Moruzzi may say something similar. Works are individual performances on her
account and thus do not undergo relevant changes. She may claim, however, that,
just as ‘‘Seeger’s String Quartet has been performed for many years’’ is about a
fusion of related works, so is the sentence ‘‘In 1890 Bruckner changed his Eighth
Symphony.’’ That is, when we ostensibly talk about the ways in which musical
works change we are not talking about works-as-performances but rather works-as-
constructs. Again, works-as-constructs are the very fusions that Caplan and
Matheson identify with works. Moruzzi, like Caplan and Matheson, may claim that
social practices enable certain individuals to change certain extrinsic properties of
these objects, including what counts as correct performances of them.
Here is the crucial similarity between Moruzzi, Caplan, Matheson, and myself.
We all may claim, pace Evnine and Rohrbaugh, that paradigmatic changes to
musical works (or works-as-constructs in Moruzzi’s case) are changes to an object’s
extrinsic properties. We are thus able to adopt my general solution to the revision
puzzle. That is, we may easily appeal to social practices to explain why some
individuals, but not others, are able to change the relevant extrinsic properties. As
noted above, social practices commonly regulate who may change some of an
object’s extrinsic properties, rather than intrinsic ones. This is true of concrete
objects, such as roads and eating utensils. Similarly, social practices regulate who
may change certain extrinsic properties of musical works.23
Given the potential for common ground between Caplan, Matheson, Moruzzi,
and myself it is fair to wonder whether one should prefer my view to their views. An
advantage of my view is that it straightforwardly allows for musical works that have
never been performed. On my view, a composer may create a work and even assign
it performance rules, without the work ever being performed. Since Moruzzi
22 See Tillman and Spencer (2012: 257) for related discussion. They propose that, even if musical works
are fusions of performances, individual performances may still count as correct or incorrect in virtue of
things that are not part of the fusion, including the intentions of composers.
23 Other theories are consistent with my general solution to the revision puzzle. For instance, the broad
framework of Cray and Matheson’s musical idealism is consistent with my solution, even though they
ultimately deny that works change (Cray and Matheson 2017: 709).
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identifies works with performances, she accepts the counterintuitive claim that there
are no unperformed works (Moruzzi 2018: 346–347). Caplan and Matheson are
committed to this claim, too, because they take works to be fusions of performances.
On the other hand, an advantage of Moruzzi’s view is that it gives a
straightforward account of how we directly access musical works. We listen to
them by listening to performances, since that is just what works are on her view
(Moruzzi 2018: 348). Caplan and Matheson, conversely, think we never directly
access works in their entirety. Instead, we directly access parts of them, since
individual performances are parts of the work (Caplan and Matheson 2008: 80–82).
Moruzzi’s view fares better than my view in this respect, too. Presumably, we
cannot directly access abstracta. Given this assumption, my view is committed to
the claim that we directly access performances of works but never works themselves
(or any part thereof). This is a disadvantage of my view.24
I will not try to weigh here the advantages or disadvantages of the proposals
under consideration. Ultimately, my view should be of special interest to theorists
who think works are abstract and who accept that the revision puzzle is a genuine
puzzle. This is because my view more easily solves the revision puzzle than
Evnine’s and Rohrbaugh’s views, both of which take works to be abstract.
4 Other abstract artifacts
My view applies to abstract artifacts beyond music. Consider words. Following
Kaplan (1990, 2011), I think a single word may be spelled and pronounced
differently. The word ‘‘color’’ is spelled with a ‘u’ in Canada and without one in the
United States. The word ‘‘data’’ has at least two familiar pronunciations. Words,
Kaplan writes, are neither ‘‘strings of letters’’ nor ‘‘pronunciations’’; they ‘‘must be
something more abstract, something that has spellings and pronunciations (Kaplan
2011, 506)’’ [original emphasis]. I agree. I think words are created abstract partless
objects. They have spellings, pronunciations, and meanings, but these things are
neither identical to nor part of words. Just as musical works have performance rules,
there are rules that determine how words should be spelled, pronounced, and used.
My view extends to many other abstract artifacts. Novels and poems are created
abstract partless objects that have verbal structures. Films are created abstract
partless objects that have image/sound-structures. Games, such as chess, are created
abstract partless objects that have rules. Corporations are created abstract partless
objects that have employees and shareholders. Fictional characters are created
abstract partless objects that have associated properties; for instance, Sherlock
Holmes, though not literally a detective, is associated with the property is-a-
detective. These cases involve distinct having relations. What it means for chess to
have rules is that while playing chess one should follow those rules. What it means
for a corporation to have employees is that those employees are tasked with doing
24 It might not be a big disadvantage, however. Dodd (2007: 92–100) argues that musical works are
indirectly audible but no less so than material objects.
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work for the corporation. Despite such differences, in each case things stand in a
having relation without standing in a relation of identity or parthood.
Evnine may claim that abstract artifacts are constituted by objects I claim they
merely have. Indeed, Evnine (2016: 139–146) claims that fictional characters are
constituted by their associated properties. On his view, Jane Austen’s Emma is
constituted by the properties is-handsome, is-clever, and is-rich, among many
others. Evnine, however, has trouble accounting for other kinds of abstract artifacts.
Imagine the president of a cooking club announces at a club meeting, ‘‘I hereby
declare we have a new position: the treasurer of this club. I open the floor for
nominations.’’ Plausibly, the president thereby creates the position of treasurer of
the club.25 One might think the treasurer position is identical to the plurality of
individuals who occupy it. This proposal has two problems. First, intuitively the
position may exist even if nobody ever occupies it. Second, imagine that someone
serves as the only treasurer ever of the cooking club and also as the only president
ever of a local chess club. If club positions are identified with their occupants, it
follows that the position of treasurer of the cooking club is identical to the position
of president of the chess club. That is implausible.26
I propose that the position of treasurer of the cooking club is a created abstract
partless object. The position may subsequently have individuals who occupy it, but
such people are neither identical to nor part of the position. It is hard to see how
Evnine can account for this case. Specifically, it is hard to see what he should claim
constitutes the position. It would seem odd for him to claim the treasurers constitute
the position, since the position may exist without anyone occupying it.
My view, then, extends to an especially wide array of abstract artifacts. Like
musical works, these other abstract artifacts may change. ‘‘Awful’’ went from
meaning only awe-inspiring to meaning also very-bad in the 19th Century. Chess
acquired the en passant rule in the 15th Century. Corporations, such as Google, hire
new employees. In all of these cases abstract objects get new extrinsic properties.
How we should use ‘‘awful’’ changes. How we should play chess changes. Who is
tasked with working for Google changes. Moreover, my view helps to solve the
revision puzzle in connection to these artifacts. Due to social practices I cannot
singlehandedly change the meaning of ‘‘awful,’’ chess’s rules, or Google’s
employees. I cannot change ‘‘awful,’’ chess, or Google for roughly the same
reason I cannot change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony.
5 Conclusion
I have proposed a view of music on which musical works are created abstract
partless objects. The view has advantages over other views considered in this paper.
Crucially, it helps to solve the revision puzzle. It helps to explain why Bruckner, but
25 I discuss this example in Friedell (2017: 448).
26 Ritchie (2013) similarly argues against accounts that identify social groups with pluralities or fusions
of their members.
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not I, may change his Eighth Symphony. The key idea is that paradigmatic changes
that musical works undergo are socially determined normative changes in how they
should be performed. These changes alter only musical works’ extrinsic properties.
Rohrbaugh’s continuant-view and Evnine’s hylomorphist proposal have a harder
time solving the revision puzzle. Moreover, theorists who think abstracta are in a
deep sense immutable should prefer my view to Evnine’s and Rohrbaugh’s views,
since my view takes only extrinsic properties of musical works to change. Another
advantage my view has over Evnine’s is that my views allows for works with no
sound structure, such as Cage’s Child of Tree. Other theories, however, such as
Moruzzi’s musical stage theory and Caplan and Matheson’s musical perdurantism,
are consistent with my general solution to the revision puzzle. A reason to prefer my
view to these two alternatives is that my view allows for the existence of
unperformed works. A final advantage is that my view applies to an especially wide
array of abstract artifacts beyond music.
My view, however, has disadvantages. Some theorists might worry that melodies
and lyrics are not part of musical works on my view, at least not in the normal sense
of ‘‘part.’’ Some theorists might worry that my view conflates genuine changes to
musical works and mere changes in how works ought to be performed. Moreover,
unlike Moruzzi’s stage theory, my view does not allow for us to directly access
musical works.
I have not settled whether my view’s advantages outweigh its disadvantages. But
I hope to have shown that the view deserves a place at the table. At the very least, I
hope to have raised a puzzle—why can’t I change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony?—
that will be appreciated even by those who reject my solution.
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